(Agencies)
Updated: 2008-04-18 09:37

US military spokesman Maj. Gen. Kevin Bergner said such attacks do not detract from a markedly improved overall situation. "We have said all along that there will be variants in which we will see al-Qaida and other groups seek to reassert themselves," Bergner said Wednesday.

The troubles on the Shiite front could be more dangerous. An offensive launched on March 25 in the southern city of Basra by Iraqi forces against Shiite militants -- particularly from al-Sadr's Mahdi Army -- touched off an uprising by Shiite militias across southern Iraq and in Baghdad's Sadr City.

Though the heaviest fighting of the operation has eased, clashes persist in Sadr City and the south, deeply straining the truce called by al-Sadr.

The Basra offensive also highlighted the continued weaknesses and divided loyalties that plague the Iraqi military, despite intensified US efforts to train its forces.

The Iraqi government has acknowledged that during the Basra fighting, at least 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and police deserted or refused to fight because of intimidation from Shiite militiamen or loyalty to al-Sadr.

But details of the operation from an Iraqi army colonel in the Basra command center suggested the problems were even deeper.

The desertions came in the army's 14th Division, which is mainly composed of troops from Basra, the colonel said. Two brigades of about 600 troops each -- about 40 percent of the division's forces involved in the operation -- refused to fight, as did most of Basra province's 11,000 police forces.

The colonel, who spoke to the AP on Thursday on condition of anonymity in return for discussing the operation, said the soldiers' loyalties are sectarian and not to the nation.

Beyond the desertions, the offensive was hastily prepared and the Basra troops were poorly trained and badly equipped, the colonel said. "They are not professional enough, so they collapsed."

The troops lacked proper maps and communication equipment and were forced to rely on mobile phones to communicate. In contrast, the Mahdi Army fighters "had good, precise intelligence, better than ours" and more powerful weapons -- including anti-tank rockets and rocket-propelled grenades, he said. With only six tanks in all of Basra province, most Iraqi troops had only automatic weapons, he said.

With control of Basra's infrastructure largely divvied up between the city's Shiite factions, the Mahdi Army controlled the city's hospitals, meaning wounded soldiers could not be taken there, he said.

It was only because of the arrival of several military and police brigades from elsewhere in the country -- including special forces -- several days after the operation began that government forces were able to gain the upper hand in the city, the colonel said.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who ordered the assault, has said it was a success. US Ambassador Ryan Crocker had praised al-Maliki for his decision to strike at Shiite militias, but he acknowledged the operation ran into "a boatload of problems."

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