Hope for renewal of talks

Under the leadership of Kim Jung-un, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has worked out a fresh diplomatic bargain with the United States by agreeing to impose a moratorium on its nuclear and long-range missile tests and its uranium enrichment in Yongbyon in exchange for 240,000 tons of "nutritional assistance" from the US. The DPRK will also allow the IAEA inspectors to return to Yongbyon to ascertain the current status of the DPRK's nuclear program.

After the long hiatus of the Six-Party Talks and the lack of any DPRK moves to restrain its nuclear program since it conducted its last nuclear test in 2009, Pyongyang has now changed its policy and agreed to restrain its nuclear and missile development, at least for a while.

No matter whether the DPRK's moratorium is a step toward a long-term rapprochement or merely leverage to obtain short-term aid, as long as the move helps reduce tension and stabilize the region, we should support it.

Though little is known about the internal situation of the DPRK outside the country, it has been widely assumed that its economic performance is not ideal. In particular, its food production and supply are likely inadequate, otherwise, it would not need to receive food aid.

Despite the DPRK's ambition to be a powerful state, it still has a long way to go to attain this objective and Pyongyang's first priority is to address its daily food supply. In this regard, to trade a nuclear and missile moratorium - it has not agreed to abandon them yet - for immediate concrete food supplies is a practical move.

However, the DPRK would benefit more by shelving or even freezing its nuclear and missile development program for longer period in exchange for more economic aid and even security guarantees. It has to move beyond a moratorium to downsize its capacity of nuclear arms fin order to gain further economic and security return.

Pyongyang's bet is clear and it will calculate its next move depending on what the US does next. It could divide its nuclear program into pieces to maximize the benefit of each and all of them. In its game with the US, each side will calculate its cost effectiveness before taking a further step. Obviously, in the worst-case scenario, the DPRK could reverse its moratorium decision and go nuclear again.

No doubt there are concerns given the DPRK's past record in negotiating its nuclear dismantlement. But this moratorium is the best the world can expect at this stage and it should be seen as an opportunity to build momentum for further progress. Therefore, we cannot afford to lose such a chance simply because of lingering suspicions.

It is not only the DPRK that benefits from the deal given its leadership succession, the US has grabbed the chance to engage with the new regime in Pyongyang. And while a moratorium on the DPRK's nuclear program is clearly not as good as the DPRK abandoning its nuclear wherewithal altogether, it is still better than the program continuing. The Obama administration has opted for a realistic, but still progressive approach to the DPRK and its nuclear program.

This moratorium deal will also boost President Obama's re-election campaign. Domestically the soaring national debt is damaging and the slightly improving employment figures are not that helpful, but against this the White House can present its foreign policy achievements: troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, the locating and killing of Osama bin Laden, resetting relations with Russia and pivoting "back to Asia". The DPRK nuclear moratorium is another addition to the list.

It is noticeable that both countries have hedged their bets, and while their reconciliatory stances are expandable they are also reversible. In particular, the DPRK's moratorium will only be valid as long as Washington still continues to talk to Pyongyang and there are already quite a few hidden obstacles, none of them insignificant, among the US-DPRK parallel statements of "agreement".

For instance, the DPRK is demanding a peace accord and the US wants the IAEA inspectors to verify the end, not just suspension, of the uranium enrichment in Yongbyon. In addition, the US wants the disabling of the 5-MW nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, with more food as an incentive. The DPRK, however, insists that it is entitled to civilian use of nuclear energy even if the military part of its nuclear program is dismantled.

But if the new agreement can be implemented it will be welcome progress toward US-DPRK reconciliation and all relevant parties should work together to support the agreement as it will help pave the way for the resuming of the Six-Party Talks.

The author is director of the Center for American Studies at the Shanghai-based Fudan University.

(China Daily 03/08/2012 page10)