|
Why does US rev up China threat?
By Michael T. Klare (The Nation)
Updated: 2005-10-08 15:38 This campaign will take two forms: first, a drive to offset any future gains
in Chinese military strength through permanent U.S. military-technological
superiority; and second, what can only be described as the encirclement of China
through the further acquisition of military bases and the establishment of
American-led, anti-Chinese alliances. None of these efforts are being described
as part of an explicit, coherent strategy of containment, but there is no doubt
from the testimony of US officials that such a strategy is being implemented.
Elements of this strategy can be detected, for example, in the March 8
testimony of Adm. William Fallon, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. "It's certainly cause for concern to
see this continuing buildup [by China]," he noted. "It seems to be more than
might be required for their defense. We're certainly watching it very closely,
[and] we're looking at how we match up against these capabilities."
To counter China's latest initiatives, Fallon called for improvements in U.S.
antimissile and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, along with a deepening
of military ties with America's old and new allies in the region. With respect
to missile defense, for example, he stated that "an effective, integrated and
tiered system against ballistic missiles" should be "a top priority for
development." Such a system, in all likelihood, would be aimed at China's
short-range missiles. He also called for establishment of a "robust and
integrated ASW architecture" to "counter the proliferation of submarines in the
Pacific."
Note that Fallon is not talking about a conflict that might occur in the
central or eastern Pacific, within reach of America's shores; rather, he is
talking about defeating Chinese forces in their home waters, on the western rim
of the Pacific. That U.S. strategy is aimed at containing China to its home
territory is further evident from the plans he described for enhanced military
cooperation with U.S. allies in the region. These plans, encapsulated in the
Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), were described by Fallon as "one of
the primary means through which we extend U.S. influence, develop access and
promote competence among potential coalition partners."
Typically, the cooperation will include the delivery of arms and military
assistance, joint military maneuvers, regular consultation among senior military
officials and, in some cases, expansion (or establishment) of U.S. military
bases. In Japan, for example, PACOM is cooperating in the joint development of a
regional ballistic missile defense system; in the Philippines it is assisting in
the reorganization and modernization of national forces; in Singapore — which
already plays host to visiting U.S. aircraft carriers — "we are exploring
opportunities for expanded access to Singaporean facilities." And this is not
the full extent of U.S. efforts to establish an anti-Chinese coalition in the
region. In his March testimony Fallon also described efforts to woo India into
the American orbit. "Our relationship with the Indian Integrated Defense Staff
and the Indian Armed Services continues to grow," he noted. "U.S. and Indian
security interests continue to converge as our military cooperation leads to a
stronger strategic partnership."
All this and much more is described as an essentially defensive reaction to
China's pursuit of forces considered in excess of its legitimate self-defense
requirements — "outsized," as Secretary Rice described the Chinese military in a
recent interview. One can argue, of course, about what constitutes an
appropriate defense capacity for the world's most populous nation, but that's
not the point — what matters is that any rational observer in Beijing can
interpret Fallon's testimony (and the other developments described above) only
as part of a concerted U.S. campaign to contain China and neutralize its
military capabilities.
|
