Dangerous vacuum left by lapse of New START

The collapse of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, on Feb 5 marked a watershed moment in global affairs. For the first time in over half a century, the world's two largest nuclear powers are no longer bound by any legally enforceable limits on their strategic arsenals.

The lapse of this final pillar of the Cold War arms control architecture has created a dangerous vacuum, yet it also presents an opportunity to move beyond a binary, outdated framework toward a more inclusive and stable global order.

The collapse of New START was not inevitable. In the months leading up to the deadline, the international community watched with concern as Washington rejected proposals to maintain the treaty's central limits. While Russia signaled a willingness to observe these caps temporarily, the United States chose a different path, opting instead to call for a new, modernized agreement that would include a broader range of actors. The result is a world where the guardrails of strategic stability have been dismantled before a new structure could even been designed.

The traditional US argument for letting the treaty expire rests on the premise that a bilateral deal between Washington and Moscow is an anachronism in a multipolar world. US officials frequently point to the modernization of other nuclear forces as a justification for abandoning existing constraints. However, this logic ignores a fundamental reality: the US and Russia still possess about 90 percent of the world's nuclear warheads. Their "special and primary responsibility" for disarmament, as recognized by the United Nations, is not a relic of the past but a functional necessity for the present. When the two largest players refuse to lead, the entire global nonproliferation regime is weakened.

In this context, China has emerged as a voice of strategic sanity. Beijing's expression of regret over the treaty's expiration reflects a broader commitment to global stability. By calling on the United States and Russia to resume their dialogue and honor the core limits of the expired pact, China is positioning itself not as an antagonist in an arms race, but as a stakeholder in a stable international system.

The Chinese approach is rooted in a defensive nuclear strategy, characterized by a long-standing "no first use" policy and a focus on maintaining the minimum deterrent necessary for national security. This stands in sharp contrast to the pursuit of absolute security through unconstrained expansion.

The current vacuum in arms control is particularly dangerous because it coincides with the rapid advancement of new technologies. We are no longer living in the era of simple missile counts. The integration of artificial intelligence into command-and-control systems, the development of hypersonic delivery vehicles, and the increasing militarization of space have created a more complex and unpredictable escalation ladder. Without the transparency and verification measures that New START provided — such as on-site inspections and data exchanges — the risk of miscalculation grows exponentially. In a world of high-speed, automated warfare, the lack of communication channels can turn a technical glitch into a global catastrophe.

This erosion of stability has triggered a forceful reaction from the world's "middle powers". In the halls of the United Nations, a coalition of nations — including Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa — has begun to voice a profound frustration that is reshaping the diplomatic landscape. These countries argued that the major powers are effectively holding the rest of the planet hostage to their strategic competition.

By failing to renew New START, Washington and Moscow are viewed as defaulting on their legal obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The response from the Global South is no longer just rhetorical. We are seeing a renewed push for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which seeks to delegitimize nuclear possession entirely. For these middle powers, the expiration of New START is proof that the old "nuclear club" is incapable of self-regulation, necessitating a shift toward a more democratic, multilateral approach to global security in which the voices of the nonnuclear majority carry real weight.

To move forward, the international community must reimagine what strategic stability looks like in the 2020s. The goal should not be to simply replicate the bilateral treaties of the 20th century, but to build a multilateral framework that reflects today's geopolitical realities. Such a framework would require a shift from a focus on numerical parity to a focus on risk reduction and crisis management. It would involve establishing norms for the use of AI in nuclear systems, creating hotlines between all major nuclear powers, and increasing transparency regarding modernization programs.

Washington's current insistence on a "three-way deal" as a prerequisite for any new agreement is a strategic mistake if it is used as an excuse to avoid bilateral progress with Russia. Arms control is not a favor that one country does for another; it is a shared interest in mutual survival. By conditioning its own restraint on the behavior of others, the US is effectively holding global stability hostage to its geopolitical competition.

The expiration of New START should serve as a wake-up call. The era of unregulated nuclear competition is a zero-sum game that no one can win.

The author is a geostrategist and political analyst based in Karachi, Pakistan.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.