Canberra should refrain from playing double game with Beijing

The latest dispute between China and Australia shows how Canberra’s preoccupation with its security alliance with the United States could risk derailing its economic ties with the world’s second-largest economy.

Australia claimed that one of its military helicopters was approached “unsafely and unprofessionally” by a Chinese helicopter while conducting what it described as a “routine patrol in support of United Nations sanctions enforcement” in the Yellow Sea.

China’s Ministry of National Defense rebutted the baseless allegation saying it was only a pretext and Australian shipborne helicopters had repeatedly carried out close-in reconnaissance against China in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. Such provocative actions clearly endanger China’s national security.

The incident is another example of a country geographically distant conducting military surveillance on China’s doorstep. No United Nations resolution has authorized any foreign military to carry out such provocative operations.

The episode is symptomatic of a deeper question about how Australia is positioning itself in the evolving strategic geometry of the Asia-Pacific with its participation in the United States’ “Indo-Pacific” strategy.

The unease is compounded by other issues. One is the future of Darwin Port, leased in 2015 to a Chinese company for 99 years through a commercial bidding process. The Anthony Albanese government has signaled that it now wants the port “returned” to Australian ownership, citing “national interest” concerns. This risks sending a message that legally signed contracts can be arbitrarily unwound under political pressure from the United States.

Canberra’s attempt to annul the contract is similar to the Panamanian government’s move to annul the contracts signed with a Chinese company to operate the ports at either end of the Panama Canal, which was also carried out under US pressure.

Another source of friction is Australia’s participation in military activities in the South China Sea alongside the Philippines and other allies. Such involvement amounts to intervention in the territorial dispute between the Philippines and China in which Australia itself has no claim.

Looming over all these actions is Australia’s “security collusion” with the US and the United Kingdom, which will eventually give Australia nuclear-powered submarines at a projected cost of hundreds of billions of dollars. Even within Australia, critics have questioned whether the arrangement risks binding the country too tightly to Washington’s strategic priorities.

The paradox is that China and Australia remain intertwined economically. China has been Australia’s largest trading partner for years, and the two economies have developed an extensive web of trade in resources, agriculture and services. Both sides acknowledge that stabilizing relations in recent years has delivered tangible benefits to businesses and households.

This economic reality makes the current tensions feel less like an inevitable clash and more like a strategic misjudgment of Canberra. The question confronting Australia is whether it can fool itself into thinking that it can continue to work with the US and its allies to contain China in geopolitical games while making money from trading with China, a country with which it maintains a sizable trade surplus.

Australia seems intent on seeking the economic benefits from cooperation with China but simultaneously participating in military activities that threaten China’s core interests. No country can accept such a double game.

This is particularly resonant in a region already unsettled by geopolitical competition. The Asia-Pacific has watched conflicts in Europe and the Middle East with unease. Once cooperation is replaced by confrontation and mutual trust is replaced by suspicion, the regional situation could deteriorate faster than Canberra expects.

In that context, the stakes extend beyond one helicopter encounter. They touch on whether the region can avoid sliding into a cycle of suspicion and military signaling.

There is still ample room for cooperation. China and Australia share interests in trade, climate policy, regional development and multilateral frameworks such as the APEC mechanism. The relationship works best when differences are managed through dialogue rather than confrontation.

But cooperation requires strategic clarity. If Australia wishes to preserve the stability that has gradually returned to its relationship with China, it needs to show that its China policy is guided not by its alliance commitments to the US but by its own long-term interests in regional stability.