Beyond lecturing: toward an inclusive human rights governance

A familiar ritual unfolded at the United Nations Human Rights Council’s session in Geneva on Wednesday: accusations were traded, moral authority was asserted, and history invoked like a legal brief. China’s representative forcefully rebutted criticism from several developed countries, with Japan as a representative, arguing that their baseless censure of China’s so-called “human rights records” cannot obscure their own unresolved past — in Japan’s case, from the “comfort women” issue to which it has given insufficient reflection.

But behind the rhetorical volleys lies a deeper question that the international community has yet to answer: Who gets to define human rights, and who decides when they are being used as a tool of geopolitical leverage rather than a universal moral compass?

China’s position, articulated again this week and elaborated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the UNHRC session, rests on a critique of the lack of reforms of the global human rights governance. It urges concrete actions to enhance efficiency, transparency and fairness. No country, Wang argued, is in a position to lecture others, a sentiment shared by the Global South countries that have rallied around calls for a more inclusive system.

Critics in the developed world counter that such arguments risk diluting “universal standards”. Yet, the same countries that denounce so-called “human rights issues” related to China’s Xinjiang Uygur and Xizang autonomous regions and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, are conspicuously silent about civilian casualties arising out of overseas military interventions and color revolutions.

According to UN data, conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya — wars launched or supported by developed “democracies” under banners that included so-called human rights and humanitarian protection — have displaced tens of millions and destabilized entire regions. So many humanitarian crises have been caused or aggravated by interventions justified citing human rights?

This tension between principle and power has long haunted the UNHRC. Established in 2006 to replace an outdated predecessor, the body now marks its 20th anniversary amid renewed doubts about whether it can escape the gravitational pull of geopolitics. The problem is not that human rights are discussed; it is that they are too often weaponized.

What, then, would a less politicized human rights system look like? Wang’s five-point proposal offers a clear framework: sovereign equality, adherence to international law, multilateral cooperation, a people-centred approach and measurable outcomes. Central to this vision is the right to development — a principle recognized in a 1986 UN declaration —?The Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986 — but often overshadowed by civil and political rights in Western discourse.

According to World Bank data, over the past four decades, China has lifted roughly 800 million people out of extreme poverty — an achievement Beijing frames as the world’s largest human rights advancement. Globally, nearly 700 million people still live in extreme poverty, most in developing countries that argue their priorities differ from those of wealthier states. For them, access to food, healthcare and education may outweigh abstract debates over governance models.

This is not an argument for relativism. It is a call for humility. Human rights should not become an instrument for interference in domestic affairs, nor a shield for abuses. They must be pursued through dialogue, capacity-building and respect for national conditions — not megaphone diplomacy.

As geopolitical tensions sharpen, the temptation to wield human rights as a cudgel will grow. The UNHRC’s challenge, 20 years on, is to resist that temptation. If the goal is truly universal dignity, then finger-pointing must give way to cooperation — and the loudest voices must learn, at last, to listen.