Beyond spheres of influence

China’s vision for cooperation with LAC countries presents them as equal partners within a Global South framework, grounded in respect for sovereignty

In December, China released its policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, the third of its kind in less than two decades. The timing is significant. It coincides with a period in which geopolitical narratives surrounding the Western Hemisphere are once again gaining prominence, accompanied by renewed emphasis on exclusion, alignment and strategic dominance. Against this backdrop, China’s updated policy document merits attention not as an arbitrary move, but as a deliberate articulation of a different approach to international cooperation.

Rather than responding to external pressure through confrontation or rhetorical escalation, the policy paper adopts a notably restrained tone. Its language is practical, forward-looking and focused on mechanisms rather than slogans. This choice itself sends a clear signal: China is not seeking to mirror geopolitical rivalry, but to rethink how cooperation with the region is organized, sustained and institutionalized.

Unlike doctrines that frame Latin America through the logic of spheres of influence, China’s policy paper does not position the region as a strategic backyard or a site of geopolitical contestation. Instead, it presents countries in the LAC region as equal partners within a broader Global South framework, grounded in respect for sovereignty, independent development paths and pragmatic cooperation. This distinction is substantive rather than rhetorical. It reflects a fundamentally different understanding of international order.

Traditional hemispheric thinking has long prioritized political exclusion and security alignment, often treating development cooperation as secondary to strategic considerations. China’s approach departs from this logic. The policy paper emphasizes partnership over alignment and capacity-building over control, signaling an effort to move beyond zero-sum frameworks and Cold War-style binaries. Cooperation is framed not as a tool of rivalry, but as a means to address shared development challenges in a complex and increasingly fractured world.

What is particularly notable is the evolution of China’s own policy architecture. Compared with the 2016 policy paper, the 2025 document places much stronger emphasis on implementation mechanisms and cross-sector coordination. Cooperation is no longer articulated primarily at the level of diplomatic intent. Instead, it is embedded in concrete institutional arrangements that span education, science and technology, digital development and people-to-people exchanges.

These areas are no longer treated as supplementary. They are presented as central pillars of long-term cooperation, designed to generate durable linkages that extend beyond political cycles. This shift reflects a growing recognition that effective international cooperation depends less on symbolic gestures and more on institutional compatibility, operational continuity and shared capacity.

Education and talent development illustrate this shift clearly. Rather than focusing solely on degree-seeking mobility, the policy advances a rebalanced package of cooperation instruments featuring expanded training opportunities alongside targeted scholarships, joint research initiatives and vocational education cooperation. This configuration reflects an understanding that sustainable partnerships require broad-based human capital development rather than narrow elite exchange.

The emphasis on training and skills development aligns closely with the practical needs of many countries in the LAC, where strengthening domestic capacity remains a central development priority. By prioritizing programs that reach a wider range of participants, the policy moves away from a symbolic model of academic exchange toward one oriented around capability-building and institutional learning. In doing so, cooperation becomes less about numbers and more about long-term impact.

Digital cooperation represents another area where the policy departs from conventional geopolitical playbooks. Instead of approaching technology primarily through a security lens, China’s policy highlights digital inclusion, skills training and technological empowerment. By focusing on capacity rather than control, the document positions digital cooperation as a shared developmental endeavor rather than a contested strategic domain.

This approach resonates with the aspirations of many countries in the region that are seeking to navigate digital transformation while avoiding new forms of dependency. It also reflects a broader trend in Global South cooperation, where technology is increasingly viewed as a tool for development governance and social inclusion rather than geopolitical leverage.

Equally significant is the attention given to people-to-people and media exchanges. In an era marked by fragmented information environments and competing narratives, direct communication and mutual understanding acquire strategic importance. Training programs for media professionals, young leaders and civil servants are designed to foster long-term trust and institutional familiarity.

These initiatives acknowledge that durable cooperation is sustained not only by economic ties, but also by social networks and shared experiences that can endure political change. By investing in these connections, the policy seeks to stabilize cooperation at the societal and institutional levels, reducing vulnerability to shifts in political climate or public opinion.

Viewed more broadly, China’s renewed engagement with the LAC region should be understood as part of an evolving Global South governance agenda. Rather than seeking to replace existing powers or impose alternative hierarchies, China’s policy advances a model of cooperation centered on inclusiveness and development effectiveness.

In this sense, the policy echoes the principles of the Global Governance Initiative, which calls for more inclusive, representative and development-oriented global governance. By emphasizing consultation, capacity-building and shared problem-solving, cooperation with the LAC region is framed not as bloc formation, but as a practical contribution to improving how global governance functions in a multipolar world.

Responding to renewed geopolitical pressure does not necessarily require mirroring confrontation. China’s policy paper demonstrates an alternative form of strategic response: countering exclusion through institutional openness. By expanding cooperation mechanisms and embedding them across multiple sectors, the policy lowers barriers for participation and decentralizes international engagement.

For countries in the LAC region, such an approach offers an alternative to binary choices. It enables them to broaden partnerships, strengthen domestic capacities and retain strategic autonomy. For the international community, it raises a wider question about the future of global cooperation: whether it will continue to be organized around exclusionary spheres of influence, or whether it can evolve toward shared governance and plural development pathways.

In this sense, China’s 2025 policy paper is less about geopolitical positioning and more about rethinking how cooperation is organized. Its significance lies not in opposing any single doctrine, but in demonstrating that international engagement need not be defined by dominance or exclusion. As global challenges grow more complex and interconnected, approaches grounded in capacity-building, institutional connectivity and mutual respect may prove not only viable, but necessary.

The author is a researcher at the Institute of International and Regional Studies and the Institute of Belt and Road Studies at Sun Yat-sen University.

The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.