Partnership versus pressure

The Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2026-30) is the principal vehicle through which the growing breadth and depth of the cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China will be translated into concrete and deliverable outcomes.

Its success will depend on whether all stakeholders can move beyond aspiration and rhetoric to implement practical programs rooted in inclusivity and long-term symbiosis.

Broadly speaking, the Action Plan is designed to dovetail with the ASEAN Community Vision 2045. Under this long-term vision, ASEAN seeks to strengthen its political-security community, economic community and socio-cultural community. China, for its part, has committed to aligning its cooperation with ASEAN's priorities, while setting clear and measurable milestones that support ASEAN's renewed pursuit of regional integration and resilience.

From the perspective of ASEAN member states, this alignment is both timely and necessary. China's strengths in digital transformation, the green transition, climate action and sustainable development correspond closely with ASEAN's developmental needs. Under the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Upgrade Version 3.0, new drivers of connectivity, such as cross-border payments, data flows, enhanced cybersecurity and improved regulatory coherence, are expected to shape the next phase of the China-ASEAN partnership.

This convergence is reinforced by demographic realities. ASEAN has a relatively young and increasingly tech-savvy population. At the same time, China has demonstrated both the capacity and the willingness to extend its digital expertise beyond its borders. As a result, cooperation in digital trade and artificial intelligence connectivity is likely to expand in both scope and depth, particularly in applied, infrastructure-oriented domains. This expansion is driven by complementary economic structures and enabled by the institutional framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership.

However, we must be clear-eyed. The China-ASEAN partnership does not exist in a geopolitical vacuum. Intensifying Sino-US competition — especially in advanced technologies — will inevitably influence the pace, structure, and limits of digital and AI cooperation between China and ASEAN. Opportunities remain significant, but the pathways forward are becoming more constrained, more differentiated, and more politically contested.

Even so, under the broader framework of sustainable development, digital infrastructure will remain the backbone of China-ASEAN cooperation. Cross-border fiber-optic networks, data centers, cloud services, smart city platforms, digital payment systems and logistics technologies continue to offer substantial opportunities. In many ASEAN member states that are digitally ready, Chinese solutions are attractive because they are cost-effective, scalable and adaptable to local conditions.

At the same time, CAFTA 3.0 — working in tandem with the Action Plan — will give digital trade, the core growth engine of China-ASEAN commerce, a significant boost. Yet this progress is unfolding under close external scrutiny. The United States, in particular, has been actively pursuing so-called agreements on reciprocal trade with individual ASEAN member states. These agreements include provisions with long-arm jurisdiction that constrain the economic sovereignty of the signatories in their trade relations with third countries.

Against this backdrop, cross-border e-commerce, digital customs systems and trade facilitation mechanisms will continue to grow, driven by genuine development needs. Meanwhile, ASEAN's fast-expanding consumer base exerts a strong pull on Chinese technopreneurs who are eager to invest in fintech, digital services and QR code-based payment interoperability across the region.

With regard to AI, ASEAN member states still retain room to cooperate with China in applied and sector-specific fields. These include manufacturing and supply-chain optimization, precision agriculture and yield prediction, healthcare diagnostics and public health monitoring, traffic management, and urban governance. These applications deliver tangible development benefits and are far less sensitive in the US' geopolitical prism than the frontier AI research.

Capacity building is another critical pillar. China can further leverage its role as a regional technology partner by expanding its AI talent training programs and establishing joint research centers throughout ASEAN. Such initiatives would not only help bridge skills gaps, but also position China favorably in shaping standards and benchmarks adopted by ASEAN user countries, particularly at a time when the risk of global technology bifurcation is growing.

Nevertheless, as Washington tightens restrictions on China's access to advanced semiconductors, AI chips and related technologies, China's development-focused and infrastructure-driven digital cooperation across ASEAN is increasingly confronted by US-led countermeasures, which emphasize security screening and alliance-based technology ecosystems.

As a result, Southeast Asia is likely to find itself navigating parallel — and in some cases hybrid — technology systems shaped by both major powers, while also managing regulatory compatibility with each. Although the space for "hedging" under the banner of strategic autonomy is narrowing, ASEAN member states will continue to keep cooperation with both China and the US viable.

Mindful of the risks of structural dependency, ASEAN governments generally view diversification of digital partnerships as a prudent strategy amid intensifying geopolitical competition. At the same time, the wave of pan-securitization promoted by the US-led West has brought issues of digital sovereignty and data security to the forefront. These concerns cast a long shadow over the durability of the China-ASEAN partnership, which fundamentally depends on trust and mutual respect.

In this context, memories remain fresh of attempts to dissuade ASEAN member states from allowing Huawei to participate in their respective 5G telecommunications projects — on security grounds that were never substantiated. More recently, however, the signing of US-initiated agreements on reciprocal trade with Malaysia and Cambodia represents an even more direct and troubling intrusion into national sovereignty.

Unlike the Huawei case, where pressure was exerted indirectly, these agreements explicitly target areas such as digital trade and the extraction of critical minerals. They have therefore raised serious alarm across the region.

Under the US-Malaysia agreement, for example, provisions allow Washington to terminate the agreement and reimpose punitive tariffs if Malaysia enters into trade arrangements deemed detrimental to US interests. Other clauses oblige Malaysia to adopt restrictive measures against third countries in lockstep with the US, besides being required to consult Washington before concluding new digital trade agreements.

Taken together, these provisions amount to a clear erosion of economic sovereignty. While no country is explicitly named, the strategic intent is unmistakable. The restrictive digital trade clauses are clearly designed to constrain China-ASEAN cooperation under CAFTA 3.0.

Despite diplomatic assurances, the hard reality is that some ASEAN member states such as Malaysia and Cambodia are now facing stark choices: either accept lopsided agreements in exchange for lower tariffs, or bear the immediate cost of punitive trade measures. This dilemma will severely test the resilience of individual ASEAN member states and the cohesion of the region as a whole.

Neither the architects of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 nor the designers of the China-ASEAN Action Plan ever anticipated such a disruptive development arising from the escalating geopolitical rivalry.

Launched in May, the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 marks the beginning of a two-decade journey toward a resilient, innovative, dynamic, and people-centered ASEAN — one positioned as a key engine of growth in the Asia-Pacific. The China-ASEAN Action Plan aligns closely with this vision, reflecting China's stated commitment to supporting ASEAN's long-term aspirations.

In this sense, the action plan represents more than mere policy alignment. It demonstrates China's willingness to build a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable and resilient shared future with ASEAN, starkly contrasting the US' predatory behavior of subjugating the Southeast Asian nations merely to satisfy its insatiable greed for geopolitical influence and transactional gains.

The author is the president of the Belt and Road Initiative Caucus for Asia Pacific. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.