Stick or twist

Will the international community support each other on climate change action or wrench into two camps after COP30

When negotiators emerged from Brazil's Belém after the 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30), they carried with them a deal described, in equal measure, as historic, fragile and incomplete. The "Belém Political Package" — decisions spanning adaptation, a just transition, technology and social equity — reaffirmed the world's commitment to climate action. Yet the conference also exposed widening fractures in the global climate system, most notably the failure to agree on a plan to phase out fossil fuels and the rise of unilateral climate-trade instruments such as the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

Taken together, the outcomes signal that global climate governance is approaching a crossroad. The question is whether the world is moving toward a new era of coordinated, equity-based climate cooperation or drifting into a landscape where climate ambition becomes increasingly entangled with geopolitical rivalry, protectionism and regulatory fragmentation.

Amid tensions between emerging economies and industrialized countries, COP30 nonetheless delivered significant progress. The most widely celebrated achievement was the decision to triple adaptation finance by 2035 — a long-standing demand from vulnerable countries confronting rising temperatures, extreme weather, and accelerating losses and damages.

Equally notable was the adoption of indicators to track progress under the Global Goal on Adaptation, covering water systems, health, infrastructure, coastal resilience, and social protection. For years, adaptation commitments were aspirational; now they will be quantifiable and comparable.

COP30 also launched a renewed just transition work program, signaling recognition that decarbonization must be socially inclusive. In Belém's riverside plenaries, negotiators repeatedly emphasized that climate action will succeed only if it protects workers, strengthens communities, and addresses inequality — a message that resonated far beyond the negotiating rooms.

COP30 strengthened mechanisms for technology transfer, non-market cooperation, and capacity-building, areas crucial for enabling developing countries to pursue economic growth while cutting emissions. In short, the conference proved that multilateral climate diplomacy is not dead. But it also revealed its limits.

For all its progress, COP30 could not deliver what many scientists, civil society groups, and vulnerable nations sought most urgently: a legally anchored plan to phase out fossil fuels.

The final text refers only to the broad commitment made at COP28 to "transition away from fossil fuels." Any reference to a binding timeline or specific phase-out language was stripped out under pressure from fossil-fuel-exporting countries.

This omission is more than symbolic. Fossil fuels account for roughly 80 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. Without a structured, time-bound decline in their use, the world will miss its 1.5 C target. As a result, the Belém Package may ultimately be judged not for what it contains, but for what it conspicuously omits.

COP30 showcased an increasingly clear clash between two paradigms shaping the future of climate governance. One model — strongly supported by many emerging economies — emphasizes equity, solidarity, and the alignment of climate goals with development needs. It finds expression in South-South cooperation, technology partnerships, green infrastructure investments, and capacity-building programs.

For many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, this approach resonates more deeply than carbon-pricing schemes or regulatory conditionality. They seek practical tools: renewable-energy technology, financing for adaptation, resilient infrastructure and low-cost energy solutions that allow them to grow while reducing emissions.

COP30's equity-focused agenda — a just transition, adaptation finance, and nonmarket cooperation — reinforced this paradigm, giving vulnerable countries a stronger voice and more tangible pathways to climate-resilient development.

In parallel, a second model is gaining ground, dominated by advanced economies. Most emblematic is the EU's CBAM, which applies a carbon price to imports of steel, cement, aluminum and other emissions-intensive goods. While framed as an environmental tool to prevent "carbon leakage", CBAM functions in practice as a trade filter: exporters must pay for carbon embedded in their products, whether or not their home countries can afford a comparable carbon-pricing system.

This approach embeds climate ambition within industrial strategy. The EU protects its industries by leveling the carboncost playing field; the United States uses subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act to re-industrialize around clean technologies; and other economies are experimenting with similar tools.

To supporters, these policies drive global ambition. To critics, they risk creating a climate order in which wealthy blocs set standards that poorer nations struggle to meet — an implicit form of green protectionism.

The coexistence of these two paradigms — one cooperative, and the other regulatory — defines today's climate action landscape. Whether they evolve into complementary pillars or conflicting regimes remains uncertain.

Arguments supporting greater cooperation are compelling. The Belém Package demonstrates that multilateralism can deliver. Clean-energy prices continue to fall, creating shared incentives for collaboration. And the renewable-energy revolution has generated unprecedented opportunities for economic transformation in developing regions.

But the counter-forces are equally strong. Fossil-fuel politics remain deeply embedded in national interests. Trade-linked carbon regulations risk sparking disputes that could fracture the global climate order. And many developing countries fear that new climate rules — however well intended — will constrain their industrialization while advanced economies benefit from fossil-fuel-driven growth.

Without strong coordination, the world could drift toward a patchwork of incompatible climate regimes: trade barriers disguised as climate tools, uneven adaptation financing, and widening inequality in access to green technologies.

But the future need not be binary. A hybrid governance model — combining inclusiveness with regulatory coherence — is both possible and necessary. Such a hybrid model would pair strong climate standards with the financing and technology support developing countries require to meet them, integrate social justice and adaptation into the core of climate policy, encourage multilateral coordination on climate-trade rules, reducing the risks of fragmented regulatory blocs, and mobilize both public funds and private capital to expand green infrastructure and industrial capacity across the Global South.

This approach is more complex than the regulatory shortcuts favored by some governments — but far more equitable and more likely to succeed.

COP30 showed that multilateral climate governance is alive, but fragile; ambitious in vision, yet often limited in execution. Whether we move toward genuine cooperation or climate protectionism will depend not only on future summits, but on decisions governments make now — in trade ministries, finance agencies, and national industrial strategies.

In the wake of COP30, the path forward is clear but narrow. The next decade will determine whether the world can build a unified, equitable climate system — or whether global climate action splinters into competing blocs, leaving vulnerable nations to bear the greatest burden of a warming world.

The author is a specialist in global affairs and sinology, and the founder of the China-Europe-America Global Initiative. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.