Virtual geopolitics

Digital space is a virtual domain where information travels at light speed, defying the conventional boundaries of time and space that govern human society. In doing so, it neutralizes the role of geography in shaping the digital geopolitical landscape. The disruptive and inherently distinct nature of digital technology long fostered the perception of cyberspace as an autonomous realm — borderless global commons existing beyond the reach of sovereign control. Yet data does not flow in a vacuum — states still retain significant control over information infrastructure, data and computing resources, and algorithms.

Digital geopolitics provides a systematic framework for understanding Sino-US competition in technology, cybersecurity, data and artificial intelligence, and moreover, helps assess its profound implications for bilateral relations and the global order. China-US relations in the digital sphere have undergone a profound transformation over the years — evolving from initial technological collaboration to strategic decoupling, and escalating from random disputes to systemic geopolitical maneuvering.

The United States now boasts a group of world-class tech giants, while China, with its massive domestic market and agile innovation model, has emerged as the global pacesetter in digital adoption and commercialization. For decades, close collaboration between the two countries fueled the growth and prosperity of the global digital sector — an era when their interests were deeply intertwined.

The 2013 Edward Snowden revelations constituted a watershed moment in catalyzing Sino-US digital geopolitics, compelling major powers to institutionalize cyber sovereignty as a core tenet of their national strategy. Huawei's technological rise as a 5G standard-bearer emerged as the critical juncture that solidified Washington's strategic resolve for technological decoupling. However, a complete eruption of geopolitical competition emerged with breakthroughs obtained in AI. The advent of generative AI fundamentally redefined both countries' conceptions of security — while cybersecurity and data security remained crucial, technological lag in this strategic domain came to be perceived as an existential national security threat. To counter China's advances in AI, the US adopted a so-called new Washington Consensus, escalating the tech rivalry beyond communications and data into the critical arenas of computational power and algorithmic dominance.

The China-US digital geopolitics competition is embodied in decoupling and "small yard, high fences" policies. Control over key resources (such as data), fundamental elements(including algorithms and computing power) and vital conduits (such as communications infrastructure) has become pivotal levers for both nations to advance their respective geopolitical objectives.

The current phase of Sino-US digital geopolitics is characterized by an offensive-defensive dynamic, with the US maintaining the strategic initiative while China adopts a more reactive posture. The US government has implemented a series of strategically calculated policies targeting critical digital domains including data governance, algorithmic systems, computing power and communications infrastructure.

In the data realm, Washington has imposed national security-based restrictions on Chinese companies' data collection and user information processing activities within US jurisdiction, while simultaneously enhancing regulatory scrutiny over overseas investments and acquisitions by Chinese tech companies.

In the algorithmic domain, the US has enacted the Export Control Reform Act, bringing advanced AI algorithms and design software under export controls while restricting Chinese researchers' participation in cutting-edge AI algorithm development.

On the computing power front, the US has imposed export restrictions on high-performance computing chips and electronic design automation software, aiming to sever China's access to critical computing resources for supercomputing and AI training.

In the realm of communications infrastructure, it has rallied allies under the Clean Network initiative to exclude Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE from participating in 5G and cloud computing infrastructure development.

Correspondingly, China has adopted a defensive posture in digital geopolitics, pursuing a balanced approach of "open development with autonomous control". The country upholds the principle of "cyber sovereignty", emphasizing data security and indigenous control over critical infrastructure while opposing external interference in its digital affairs.

China continues to open its digital economy to the world while vigorously advancing independent innovation in core technologies. In the field of AI applications, China has adopted a distinctive "scenario-driven" development model. By leveraging its vast application markets and rich data resources, the country has established diversified application ecosystems across intelligent manufacturing, digital healthcare, autonomous driving and fintech sector.

Unlike the US' approach of focusing on "large models, massive computing power and big data" for general AI, China has been refining algorithms under "open-source, moderate computing power and limited data" scenarios to drive breakthroughs in AI applications for specialized vertical domains.

The US digital containment strategy against China has proven largely ineffective, achieving neither its intended "surgical precision" in targeting China's tech sector nor long-term suppression. In the AI domain, open-source models have made surprising gains, now competing head-to-head with their proprietary counterparts in both performance and market penetration.

On the computing power front, both the Joe Biden administration and the Donald Trump administration have invested considerable political capital to establish an export control network targeting China, aiming to stifle its chip industry and retard its AI progress. However, these measures failed to stem the flow of advanced chips, but instead, catalyzed China's efforts to build its own semiconductor supply chain with renewed urgency.

This outcome underscores a fundamental reality: traditional geopolitical playbooks face inherent limitations when applied to the digital sphere, where they must contend with the immutable forces of market economics and technological evolution.

At its core, the digital competition between the US and China defies zero-sum logic, presenting instead a nuanced matrix of competitive and collaborative elements.

On the one hand, the fundamentally open architecture of digital technologies and deeply integrated global supply chains render full decoupling virtually unfeasible. On the other hand, facing intensifying US technological constraints, China has opted for a balanced approach of expanding openness while advancing autonomous innovation. This dual-pronged strategy has enabled China to achieve significant technological independence and systemic advancements despite external pressures, showcasing notable adaptive capacity.

Moreover, both nations maintain convergent interests in digital economy collaboration, AI development and cybersecurity coordination. Addressing transnational challenges — particularly global governance and cybercrime countermeasures — necessitates joint rule-making and collaboration between Washington and Beijing.

The future of digital geopolitics will be determined by the capacity to establish equilibrium between strategic rivalry and shared benefits. Persistent isolationism and unconstrained confrontation will result in instability to the global digital infrastructure, suppress technological progress and generate regulatory voids — an ultimately counterproductive outcome for all stakeholders. On the contrary, maintaining market accessibility, deepening multilateral cooperation and cultivating indigenous innovation capabilities constitute fundamental prerequisites for sustainable growth within this competitive paradigm.

The author is a professor at the School of Political Science and International Relations at Tongji University and executive deputy director of the Institute for Cyberspace Governance Studies at Tongji University. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily. 

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.